Abstraction is a powerful idea widely used in science, to model, reason and explain the behavior of systems in a more tractable search space, by omitting irrelevant details. While notions of abstraction have matured for deterministic systems, the case for abstracting probabilistic models is not yet fully understood.
Introduction
Abstraction is a powerful idea widely used in science to explain phenomena at the required granularity. Think of explaining a heart disease in terms of its anatomical components versus its molecular composition. In computer science, it is often understood as the process of mapping one representation onto a simpler representation by suppressing irrelevant information. The motivation is threefold:
(a) When representing complex pieces of knowledge, abstraction can provide a way to structure that knowledge, hierarchically or otherwise, so as to yield descriptive clarity and modularity.
(b) Reasoning over large graphs, programs, and other structures is almost always computationally challenging, and so abstracting the problem domain to a smaller search space is attractive. Even in the case of tractable representations, such as arithmetic circuits [Darwiche and Marquis, 2002] , reasoning is polynomial in the circuit size, so clearly a smaller circuit is more effective.
(c) Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, abstraction features pervasively in commonsense reasoning, and there is much discussion in the fields of cognitive science and philosophy on the role of abstractions for explanations [Jorland, 1994, Dedre and Christian, 2017] ; for example, [Garfinkel, 1981] argues that concrete explanations containing too much detail are sensitive to perturbations and are impractical for understanding physical phenomena. Thus, abstractions will likely be critical for explainable AI [Gunning, 2016] , and indeed, much of that literature focuses on extracting high-level symbolic and/or programmatic representations from lowlevel data (e.g., [Penkov and Ramamoorthy, 2017, Sreedharan et al., 2018] ).
However, the formal analysis of abstraction has largely focused on categorical (e.g., deterministic, non-probabilistic) domains [Giunchiglia and Walsh, 1992, Milner, 1989] , and so is not immediately applicable to the field of statistical machine learning. We do not yet have a full understanding of which aspects of one probabilistic model, representing some low-level phenomena, can be omitted when building a less granular model, possibly standing for a high-level understanding of the domain.
In this paper, we develop a foundational framework for abstraction in probabilistic relational models from first principles. Probabilistic relational models (PRMs) generalize standard (propositional) probabilistic models in borrowing syntactic constructs from first-order logic [Heckerman et al., 2004 , Getoor and Taskar, 2007 , Richardson and Domingos, 2006 . Thus, our results are applicable to a very general class of probabilistic models that are additionally able to reason about relational data and hierarchical constraints. We motivate a definition of consistency between a high-level model and its low-level counterpart, but also treat the case when the high-level model is missing critical information present in the lowlevel model. We prove properties of abstractions, both at the level of the parameter as well as the structure of the models. We hope our framework is helpful in developing probabilistic abstractions for increased clarity, modularity and tractability.
Desiderata
Before developing a framework for abstraction, let us briefly reflect on what precisely is desired of such a framework. In essence, abstractions are primarily about omitting irrelevant details, while providing a less granular language to capture and reason about the underlying probabilistic components. To motivate that using an example, consider the PRM from [Heckerman et al., 2004] on entity-relationships for a university database U. The model instantiates constraints for a (parameterised) Bayesian network: Difficulty Grades IQ as follows, referred to as the low-level theory U l in the sequel: (x, y, u) for u ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10} (x, y, u) for u ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}
where the constants E, M, H, L stand for easy, medium, hard, low respectively. (A precise encoding will be presented in a subsequent section.) The first constraint says that for given any course, say B, the probability that its difficulty level is easy is .7. More generally, this theory says that courses come in three levels of difficulty, and when a low IQ student takes an easy course, his grades can be modeled as a uniform distribution on {7, 8, 9, 10}, and when he does not take an easy course, it is a uniform distribution on {5, 6, 7, 8}.
A simple yet powerful type of abstraction to apply here is domain abstraction. Assuming the above sentences are the only ones of interest to us, we can lump the constants {M, H} as N, standing for not easy, and lump the mentioned grade values together as {5, 6} , {7, 8} , {9, 10} and denote them as B, O, G, standing for bad, ok and good respectively. Then, we would obtain the following model, referred to as the high-level theory U h in the sequel: 1 (x, y, u) for u ∈ {O, G}
On closer inspection, the reader may observe that U h is, in fact, a very faithful abstraction of U l , in terms of accurately grouping together probabilistic events. Indeed, we will formally show that the two models agree on a large class of probabilistic queries. The benefit, of course, is that U h is defined over a smaller set of random variables.
However, such a faithful alignment may not always be needed, or even feasible. Consider a case of predicate abstraction, where one groups definitions and complex formulas using new predicates. Suppose we had a course listing database C. Let C l be a low-level theory:
We may want to define a high-level theory C h that simply uses Science(x) in place of CS(x) and Physics(x). But then the weight on rules such as Science(x) ⊃ diff (x, H) or Science(x) ⊃ diff (x, E) may not be immediate to derive, in general. Predicate abstraction can also be used as a strategy to check for probabilistically significant events. For example, an administrator may only be interested in ensuring that all low IQ students enroll in an easy course:
and specifically, whether that atom ever obtains a nonzero probability. Indeed, the literature on verification and security often approach the reasoning of complex systems by distinguishing bad states (e.g., invalid paths, safety conditions) [Sharma et al., 2013] , and correspondingly, checking whether such states are probable or improbable. Naturally, by means of a relational language, such definitions can arbitrarily complex and hierarchical, and different from classical works on categorical abstraction, predicates at every level can denote stochastic primitives.
In that spirit, we show that abstraction can be understood both from the viewpoint of the parameters (i.e., weights and/or probabilities) and structure (i.e., the logical sentences). While we do discuss the case of aligning probabilities exactly between the high-level and low-level models, we also consider the most immediate case of parameter abstraction where one obtains an alignment between the probable and improbable events. When it comes to abstracting structure, we show that one wants to ensure that the high-level model is consistent, and perhaps additionally that it is not missing critical information present at the low-level model. This then motivates a definition of soundness and completeness.
We reiterate that our focus here is primarily about the semantic constraints for analyzing abstractions. Thus, at the outset, we assume that we are given a high-level theory, capturing the more abstract probabilistic model, and a low-level theory, understood as the underlying probabilistic model that is to be abstracted.
Preliminaries

Logical Language
We assume a first-order language with finitely many relational symbols P 1 (x), . . . , P 2 (x, y), . . . , P 3 (x, y, z), . . . , variables {x, y, z, . . .}, connectives ∨, ¬, ∧, ∀ and a finite set of constants D, serving as the domain of discourse for quantification. Usual abbreviations hold for connectives: we write α ⊃ β (material implication) to mean ¬α ∨ β, α ≡ β (equivalence) to mean (α ⊃ β) ∧ (β ⊃ α), and ∃xα (existential quantification) to mean ¬∀x¬α. In particular, when the domain is fixed to a finite set D, we write ∀x α(x) to mean c∈D α(c). Moreover, α ∧ β is equivalent to ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β), so in proofs, we only consider the connectives {∧, ¬} .
The set of (ground) atoms is defined as:
The set of literals is obtained from the set of atoms, and their negations.
A model M is a {0, 1} assignment to the set of atoms. Using | = to denote satisfaction, the semantics for a formula φ is defined inductively:
We say a formula φ is satisfiable iff there is a model M such that M | = φ. We say that φ is valid, written | = φ, iff for every model M, M | = φ. Moreover, we write φ | = α to mean that in every model M such that M | = φ, it is also the case that M | = α.
To prepare for our technical discussion, we discuss some notational conventions. Given a formula ∆, we write Lang(∆) to mean the the logical sub-language implicit in ∆: that is, the set of well-formed formulas constructed from relations relations P 1 (x), . . . and constants D mentioned in ∆. We can then write α ∈ Lang(∆) to mean such as well-formed formula. Analogously, we write Lits(∆) to mean the set of literals
, and so on. We often abuse notation and write c ∈ D to mean that each of the constants mentioned in c is taken from D. Finally, given a ∆, when we write M | = ∆, it is implicit here that we take M to be a model for the language Lang(∆); that is, it is a {0, 1} assignment to the set of atoms in Lang(∆). We can make this explicit by writing M ∈ Models(Lang(∆)), or simply M ∈ Models(∆) for short. 2
Weighted Model Counting
To develop our framework, we appeal to the technical device of weighted model counting (WMC) [Bacchus et al., 2009] . WMC is defined over the models of a propositional formula, and serves as an assembly language for a number of heterogeneous representations, including factor graphs, Bayesian networks, probabilistic databases and probabilistic programs [Bacchus et al., 2009 , Suciu et al., 2011 , Fierens et al., 2011 . WMC enjoys a number of interesting properties that makes it particularly well-suited for our endeavor. First, it separates the symbolic representation (i.e., a logical encoding of the probabilistic model) from a weight function denoting the probabilities of variables, which allows us to investigate abstractions both at the level of structures and at the level of parameters. Second, WMC provides a semantic as well as a computational view for probabilistic reasoning. Semantically, the models of propositional formulas map to states in probability spaces (i.e., assignments of values to random variables). Computationally, we are able to reuse SAT technology for building exact and approximate solvers [Gomes et al., 2009] , while still leveraging context-specific independences [Boutilier et al., 1996] .
Essentially, model counting is the task of counting the models of a propositional formula [Gomes et al., 2009] . WMC extends that problem setting in additionally according weights to literals, and summing the weights of the models, defined in terms of the product of the literal weights. Formally, Definition 1. Suppose ∆ is a ground first-order sentence. Suppose w is a function that maps the elements of Lits(∆) to R [0,∞) . Then the WMC of ∆ is defined as:
Given a formula φ ∈ Lang(∆), we can query φ wrt evidence e for theory (∆, w) using:
When e = true, we simply write Pr(φ, ∆, w). We remark for Pr(φ, ∆, w) to be well-defined, which is assumed, WMC(∆, w) 0. (Thus, it is assumed that ∆ is satisfiable, and that w does not map all the corresponding literals to 0.) If the context is clear, we often refer to ∆ as the theory, and to φ as the query or event.
We immediately observe the following property from the definition of WMC. (Proofs are provided in the supplementary material.)
Example 3. We illustrate a WMC encoding for U l based on the university PRM; the encoding for others considered in this work are analogous. First, note that in atoms such as diff (x, y), the logical variable y captures the possible values of a random variable. Thus, they are to behave like logical functions. Formally, let U l be the union of the following, the free variables being implicitly universally quantified from the outside:
The reason we need to introduce auxiliary predicates f 1 and f 2 is because WMC only allows weights on (ground) literals.
We also need the following hard constraints for capturing the logical functions:
Suppose the domain of quantification for the students is only {A} and for courses is only {B}. We then obtain atoms such as:
with a weight function w l for positive atoms derived from the parametric specification in an obvious fashion:
We let the weight of a negated atom w l (¬a) to be 1 − w l (a). Moreover, the ground instances f 1 and f 2 obtain the weights discussed in the parameterized version. The weights of all atoms not mentioning predicates diff , f 1 , f 2 is taken to be 1. It then follows that Pr(diff (B, E), U l , w) = .7, and Pr(grades (A, B, 7) | e, U l , w) = .25, where e = takes(
Abstraction Framework
We assume that the abstraction framework is realized in terms of two types of representations: a highlevel/abstract theory that is mapped to a pre-existing low-level/concrete theory. Essentially, the logical symbols (predicates and constants) may differ arbitrarily between the two theories. In terms of notation, we use the subscript h to refer to components of the high-level theory, and l to refer to that of the low-level theory.
The first step is to formally establish the construct of a refinement mapping between the two theories: the mapping associates each high-level atom to a low-level formula, which may be arbitrarily complex.
Definition 4. Suppose ∆ h and ∆ l are two theories. We say m is a refinement mapping from ∆ h to ∆ l iff for all high-
The mapping m is assumed to extend to complex formulas φ ∈ Lang(∆ h ) inductively: for atoms φ = P( c),
It is worth noting that a mapping is deliberately asymmetrical in the sense that its range need not include all the atoms of the low-level theory. That is, there may be atoms d ∈ Lang(∆ l ), and consequently, also constants and relations, that do not appear in m(P(c)) for every P(c) ∈ Lang(∆ h ). After all, abstractions are about omitting irrelevant details.
In general, we will want to use these mappings to discuss model-theoretic properties of the two theories, so we introduce the notion of an isomorphism:
Definition 5. Given a refinement mapping m as above, we say that
Thus, isomorphism provides a way to align the truth values between high-level atom and low-level formulas. In particular, because of how refinement mappings can be defined for complex formulas, we obtain the following property:
Example 7. For the university PRM, we provide a mapping m U below. When free variables appear, we take it mean that the mapping applies to all substitutions. So, let m U map diff (x, E), takes (x, y) (x, y, 8) , and m U (grades(x, y, G)) = grades(x, y, 9) ∨ grades (x, y, 10) .
Suppose the domain includes a single student A, who takes course B. Suppose M h is a model of U h where {iq(A, L), takes(A, B), diff (B, E), grades(A, B, O)} holds. Now consider the model M l of U l where {iq(A, L), takes(A, B), diff (B, E), grades(A, B, 7)} holds. It is easy to verify that M h ∼ m M l , because the main question is whether M l satisfies m U (grades(A, B, O)) = grades(A, B, 7) ∨ grades(A, B, 8), which it does.
In the following sections, we will discuss the properties of abstractions based on mappings and isomorphisms.
Unweighted Abstractions
To obtain intuitions about the properties of abstract models from first principles, we will consider a fundamental type of abstraction: the absence of probabilities. 4 In so much as probabilistic assertions quantify the likelihood of worlds, omitting probabilities still informs us about the possible and the certain, thus allowing us to test whether ∆ h is consistent with ∆ l .
Definition 8. Given a weighted theory (∆, w), the unweighted setting refers to the case when for all P( c) ∈ Lang(∆), we have w(P( c)) = w(¬P( c)) = 1.
Since probabilities do not occur in the setting, we can establish consistency by checking whether all conclusions by ∆ h (that is, certain events) are also conclusions by ∆ l : in other words, are the conclusions sound? We define:
Theorem 10. Suppose ∆ h is a sound abstraction of ∆ l relative to m. Then for all φ ∈ Lang(∆ h ): (a) if
Example 11. It is easy to check that for the university PRM, U h is a sound abstraction of U l wrt m U .
It is fairly straightforward to construct trivially unsound abstractions. To see a less obvious example, consider C l from before, and suppose it also included: CS(x) ⊃
Programming(x) and Physics(x) ⊃ Fieldwork(x). And as discussed, let C h be a high-level theory with the predicate Science(x), but not CS(x) and Physics(x).
Suppose B is a CS-course. Suppose m C is a mapping that replaces Science(x) by CS(x) ∨ Physics(x), but maps every other predicate to itself. Then, we have Pr(φ, C h , w h ) = 1 for φ = Science(B) ∧ Programming(B) ∧ Fieldwork(B), whereas, Pr(m(φ), C l , w l ) 1, because there will be possible worlds where CS(B) ∧ ¬Fieldwork(B).
Sound abstractions ascertain that conclusions by ∆ h are consistent with ∆ l . What about events considered possible by ∆ h ? Because we are omitting information when constructing an abstract model, it may be that ∆ h entertains an event as possible even though ∆ l does not.
Definition 12. The theory ∆ h is a complete abstraction
Theorem 13. Suppose ∆ h is a complete abstraction of
Put differently, an exhaustive (but perhaps impractical) way to verify whether ∆ h is a sound (or complete) abstraction is to verify that the properties discussed in Theorem 10 (or 13 respectively) hold.
Example 14. The university PRM can be seen as a complete abstraction wrt m U .
To see a case where it is not complete, consider a variant high-level theory U ′ h where we ignore the difficulty of courses and have only one rule: iq(x, L) ∧ takes(x, y) ⊃ grades (x, y, u) where u ∈ {B, O, G}. Suppose the low-level theory is U ′ l = diff (B, H) ∧ U l , and A is a low-IQ student who takes B. It is easy to see that Pr(φ,
L) ∧ takes(A, B) ∧ grades(A, B, G), because U ′
h says that any of the three grades levels are possible. But clearly, B being a hard course means that diff (B, H) ∧ m U (φ) cannot be satisfiable, and so it is a zero-probability event wrt U ′ l . Definition 15. The theory ∆ h is a sound and complete abstraction of ∆ l relative to m iff ∆ h is both a sound and a complete abstraction of ∆ l relative to m.
Theorem 16. Suppose ∆ h is a sound and complete abstraction of ∆ l relative to m. Then for every
φ ∈ Lang(∆ h ), (a) Pr(φ, ∆ h , w h ) > 0 iff Pr(m(φ), ∆ l , w l ) > 0; and (b) Pr(φ, ∆ h , w h ) = 1 iff Pr(m(φ), ∆ l , w l ) = 1.
Weighted Abstractions
Clearly the above theorems would not hold in general when considering non-trivial weights. It is easy to imagine a weight function that redistributes weights such that zero probability events in ∆ l have high probabilities in ∆ h , and vice versa. So, outside the case of probabilities mapping exactly between ∆ h and ∆ l (discussed in the next section), we need to understand how to abstract weighted theories. The previous section provided a recipe for abstractions, from which properties discussed in Theorems 10 and 13 followed. To a first approximation, then, we can motivate a definition for weighted abstractions by requiring that those properties hold categorically, in the form of constraints. But it turns out, we can do better. We can show that if the property about probable events hold as a constraint wrt a sound or complete abstraction, then the corresponding property about certain events follows as a consequence. (Recall that this duality is not about an event and its negation, which would follow from the axioms of probability, but about how the high-level and low-level theories align.)
To prepare for this approach, let us begin with a few properties that follow from the axioms of probability [Fagin and Halpern, 1994] , but are established here using WMC:
Theorem 17. Suppose (∆, w) is a weighted theory. Then the following hold for all φ, ψ ∈ Lang(∆):
Definition 18. The theory (∆ h , w h ) is a weighted sound abstraction of (∆ l , w l ) relative to refinement mapping m iff ∆ h is a sound abstraction of ∆ l relative to m, and for all
We will now that this stipulation at the level of literals immediately implies the validity of the constraint for all formulas:
The key result of this definition is that the property on certain events, seen in Theorem 10 follows as a consequence:
Example 21. The university PRM can be seen to be a weighted sound abstraction wrt m U .
Consider the university PRM with a variant high-level theory U ′′ h , where the third constraint is the following instead: (A, B) ⊃ grades(A, B, O) . Clearly, the low-level theory accords a non-zero probability to m U (φ), but because of the third constraint, U ′′ h accords a zero probability to φ. Thus, this is not a sound weighted abstraction.
Following these results, extending complete abstractions as well as sound and complete abstractions is analogous, which we state here for the sake of completeness. (The proofs are also analogous and hence omitted.)
Example 24. The university PRM can be seen to be a weighted complete abstraction wrt m U . Example 14 also applies as an instance of an abstraction that is not weighted complete via:
Mainly because the difficulty of courses is ignored, an event is considered probable by the high-level theory but not by the low-level one.
Definition 25. The theory (∆ h , w h ) is a weighted sound and complete abstraction of (∆ l , w l ) relative to refinement mapping m iff it is both a weighted sound and a weighted complete abstraction.
Theorem 26. Suppose (∆ h , w h ) is a weighted sound and complete abstraction of (∆ l , w l ) relative to m. Then for all
Exact Abstractions
The most faithful case of aligning the high-level and lowlevel theories is when the probabilities coincide for all high-level queries.
Definition 27. The theory (∆ h , w h ) is a weighted exact abstraction of (∆ l , w l ) relative to refinement map-
The key property here is that it suffices for the modeler to ascertain the alignment for literals, after which it follows for all formulas.
Example 29. The university PRM can be seen to be an instance of a weighted exact abstraction wrt m U .
In contrast, the variant in Example 14/24 does not belong to this type because the high-level theory accords a probability of 1/3 to a low-IQ student taking a difficult course and still getting a good grade, whereas the lowlevel theory considers that improbable.
Towards Abstracting Evidence
Recall that we can query φ wrt evidence e for theory (∆, w) using ( ‡). We assumed so far that φ, e ∈ Lang(∆). However, in many applications needing abstraction, it is often the case that observations are low-level (e.g., readings on sensor), whereas the query is at the high-level (e.g., interactions with user). In this section, we discuss some ways to reconcile this issue. 6 Consider low-level evidence e ∈ Lits(∆ l ). For simplicity, let e be a literal. Without loss of generality, let mappings be in conjunctive normal form (CNF). We say a literal is pure in a CNF θ if its complement does not appear in θ. (E.g., p is pure in p ∨ q but not in ¬p ∨ q; in contrast, ¬p is pure in the latter but not the former.) We observe that, by construction, there may be many high-level atoms that map to formulas involving e. So, given a mapping m, let us retrieve these by concretization:
(That is, m(P( c)) is a CNF formula.) Here, m −1 (e) is equivalently expressed as a formula: P i ( c i ). The idea is that by looking at high-level atoms where e is pure under the mapping, we are essentially finding atoms that agree with the evidence (and not its negation).
We can now retrieve all low-level sentences these map to by re-applying m as follows: m(m −1 (e)) = m(P i ( c i )). (It is easy to see that e will remain pure in m(m −1 (e)).)
An immediate case, then, of conditioning being straightforward is when e = m(m −1 (e)):
Theorem 30. Suppose (∆ h , w h ) is a weighted exact abstraction of (∆ l , w l ) relative to m. Suppose e ∈ Lits(∆ l ) and e = m(m −1 (e)). Then for any φ ∈ Lang(∆ h ),
A simple example is the case of diff (x, E) in the university PRM, as it was mapped to the same atom at both levels.
But beyond this simple case, it is not always possible to reason about low-level events in an exact manner at the high-level. Indeed, as mentioned before, omitting details is the very goal of abstraction. For example, in the university PRM, given any course B, Pr(diff (B, M), U l , w l ) = .1, but clearly there is no way to syntactically arrange diff (B, E), diff (B, N) in U h to obtain that number. Of course, it would not be hard to show a more involved property, such as Pr (diff (B, N) ,
Rather than treating such properties, we will consider the case where probabilities can correspond exactly. Then, one way to incorporate low-level evidence is to weaken it, in the sense that conditioning wrt the low-level theory would suffer from a loss in detail, which is precisely the problem faced by the high-level theory. We may think of using m(m −1 (e)), for example. However, that is not sufficient for conditioning to be correct, because m(m −1 (e)) can say more and less than e. For example, in the university PRM, suppose we have evidence e = diff (B, M) (B, H) , which is saying less than e. This is reasonable. But suppose for the sake of the argument,
(This is somewhat artificial but well-defined.) The problem is that e does not imply anything about the difficulty of course C. Thus, if we use m U (m −1 U (e)) as evidence, we will be falsely assuming facts that were not observed.
To get around this, we stipulate this implication formally:
Definition 31. Given evidence e and mapping m, we define the m-weakening of e as m(m −1 (e)). It is definable iff e | = m(m −1 (e)). U (e)) at the low-level.
Discussions
Abstraction is a major topic in knowledge representation [Giunchiglia and Walsh, 1992 , Erol et al., 1996 , Saitta and Zucker, 2013 , Banihashemi et al., 2017 . The idea of establishing mappings between models to yield a semantic theory for abstraction owes its origin to works such as [Milner, 1989] . But formal treatments have been mostly restricted to categorical and non-probabilistic features. Our work is inspired by this body of work, but generalizes it to develop a mathematical framework for stochastic primitives in a rich, relational language.
In the area of program verification, static analysis and abstraction interpretations are commonplace to test the correctness of programs and probabilistic programs. For example, [Zhang et al., 2017] consider statistical properties of program behavior to advise abstractions, [Sharma et al., 2013] relate verification to the learnability of concepts, [Holtzen et al., 2017 ] study abstract predicates for loop-free probabilistic programs, and [Monniaux, 2001] defines abstract representations for probabilistic program path analysis. A number of additional concerns present themselves in a programmatic setting, including branching in the presence of stochastic primitives, and stochastic transitions between program states. The motivation then is to deduce sound abstractions for verifying correctness (e.g., termination) properties. While some of these works do not consider abstractions themselves to be probabilistic, the developments are related to our goals. Thus, it would be interesting to know how ideas and techniques from the program analysis literature can be carry over to our framework, and vice versa. Abstraction is also a long-standing concern in causal modeling. In recent work, [Rubenstein et al., 2017 ] study consistency between what they view as micro and macro-level variables via structural equation models.
To summarize, we were motivated in the development of a framework for abstractions in PRMs, based on isomorphisms between models, where atoms in a high-level theory can be mapped to complex formulas at the lowlevel, thereby exploiting the first-order expressivity. From that, we developed a number of accounts of abstraction, in case exact alignments are not feasible, and how one could handle low-level evidence. Our account was based on WMC, which also serves as an algorithmic account of how to compute and compare probabilities. Given the increasing interest in abstraction for probabilistic planning and statistical explainable AI, we hope our framework is helpful in developing probabilistic abstractions for increased clarity, modularity and tractability.
